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BOOK REVIEWS
A STUDY BASED ON STEEL.
By Gardiner C. Means. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.
Pp. xxi, 359. $7.50.

PRICING POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST:

In defending the pricing policy of United States Steel since the beginning of World War II, the President of that company dosed his formal statement to the Kefauver Committee of the United States Senate
with these words: "So, in the light of these facts and all of these responsibilities, I commend to the thoughtful consideration of this committee the question of whether or not our price action was responsible and in
the public interest."' Part I of Pricing Power and the Public Interest
meets this question squarely and marshals the evidence to support the
author's conclusions that United States Steel's pricing policies since 1952
have not been in the public interest. Parts II, III and IV of the book
go on to suggest that the important social and economic problems raised
by the existence of an unhealthy degree of pricing power on the part of
United States Steel and other giant manufacturing enterprises can be
solved. This solution depends upon the adoption of a new set of standards of business performance by management, stockholders, the courts
and the federal government. The author translates his theory into a
new law which, while requiring extended discussion and refinement, he
believes would be effective.
Mr. Means begins his examination of steel price behavior by noting
that administered prices have three major characteristics. They tend to
remain constant over long periods of time in spite of fluctuations in
demand and supply and in the resulting rate of operation; different companies tend to set the same prices for the same product; and price leadership by one company exists. The evidence demonstrates that steel prices
possess all of these characteristics, and that, except in rare situations,
United States Steel fills the role of price leader. These facts form the
basis for the conclusion that this company has a degree of discretion in
setting its prices which constitutes a significant amount of economic
power. The question of whether or not this power has been used "responsibly and in the public interest" is brought sharply into focus.
After explaining the expected effect of various forms of inflation
1. P. 45.
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upon administered prices, the author considers the reasons for the rise
in prices of steel since 1942. For purposes of analysis, he divides this
twenty year period into two parts: 1942-1953 and 1953-1962. He begins his analysis of prices in 1942 because at this point, traces of the
post depression reflation appear to have ended. Between 1942 and 1953,
finished steel prices rose almost 100%, while the wholesale price index
for the same period rose only 72%. While the evidence on the subject
is acknowledged to be incomplete, it does indicate that some of the rise
in steel prices in excess of the rise in the wholesale price index is accounted for by increased nonproduction labor costs and by the increased
cost of raw materials and purchased services.
That the entire increase was justified and reasonable seems to be
indicated by the fact that while the producer margin per unit of product
remaining after meeting operating expenses rose 101% during this
period, increased taxes ate up all but 53% of the rise. Furthermore, the
increase in total capital required per ton of steel rose 46% for the same
period. Therefore, when factors of inflation are considered, it appears
that in 1953, in spite of the 53% rise in producer margin after taxes, the
rate of recovery of capital was approximately the same rate that existed
in 1942.
Using the same type of analysis, Mr. Means finds no justification
for the steel price increase after 1953. His economic analysis of price
behavior in that period leads him to conclude that a 7% price increase
was necessary to offset increased labor costs, a 4% price increase to of fset increased costs of materials and services, and a 4% price increase to
cover the needed increase in producer margin in order to maintain the
rate of return on capital. Therefore, an overall 15 % price increase would
have been justified. During this period, however, steel prices rose 36%,
of which 21% appears to have gone into increased profits over and
above the satisfactory level of profits maintained in 1953.
The author then returns to the question posed at the beginning.
Has the price action of United States Steel been "responsible and in the
public interest"? Mr. Means refuses to brand the conduct of the company as having been irresponsible, since no new standards of corporate
responsibility have been spelled out to replace the older and now outdated
standard requiring management to make the highest possible profits. On
the question of public interest, however, an answer can be given. The
public interest is served when prices just cover economic costs, including
a fair rate of return on capital. This rate of return is equal to the cost
of capital in the market. Steel prices in the period under consideration
have consistently yielded a much greater return after taxes than any
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conceivable reasonable rate at which capital is available.'
In considering possible solutions to the problem which he has posed,
the author begins by making an analysis of the possible applicability of
the rules of classical competition to the steel industry. While admitting
that the existence of classical competition would serve the public interest,
he states that

"...

one glance at the steel industry leaves no doubt that

modem industry does not, and cannot be made to, meet the conditions of
classical competition."' This conclusion is based on two arguments. In
the first place, there are so few facilities for the production of pig iron
and certain steel products that even if each unit of production were
owned by a different company, there would still be too few enterprises
in any given geographical market to make up the "forest of enterprises"
necessary for classical competition. In the second place, maximum efficiency calls for the existence of large vertically integrated steel enterprises with multiplant operations. Carl Kaysen and Donald F. Turner
in their recent book throw some doubt upon this second assumption.4
According to them, "all of the technical economies of scale are achieved
at the level of the plant rather than of the firm, and the greatest part of
the size difference between very large and large firms (say $500 million
and over assets in the first class, and $50 to $500 million in the second)
lies in the number of plants they operate rather than in the size of the
plants themselves." ' Therefore, these authors would deny the existence
of substantial savings in terms of efficiency in the very class of enterprises in which Mr. Means finds this to be an important consideration.
In spite of the lack of conclusive empirical evidence on either side of the
question, they would require giant enterprises to bear the burden of show2. The author discusses in greater detail the harm to the public interest which is
brought about by these "premium profits" on page 159. It should be noted that the
claim which is frequently heard that modern corporate enterprises must make higher than
normal profits for purposes of reinvestment in the business in order to expand to meet
increased demand is unfounded. What this amounts to is an avoidance on the part of the
enterprise of paying for the increased capital which it needs in order to expand. The
costs of such capital are shifted from the corporation where they belong to the consumers
who are later asked to pay prices resulting in more premium profits for products
resulting from this "free" capital investment by the corporation.
3. P. 182. (Emphasis in original.)
4. Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (1959).

5. Id. at 6. At page 183 of his book, Mr. Means points out the economies which
result from keeping the steel hot through successive stages of the manufacturing process.
While this is a valid example of economy resulting from large-scale operations, it
applies, as Mr. Means points out, to an integrated plant. This does not dispute the point
which Kaysen and Turner are making, namely, that such economies are made at the
plant level and not at the firm level through multiplant activities. It is Mr. Mean's
argument in favor of the existence of economies resulting from multiplant operations
that appears to be vulnerable. Of course, this assumes that a correct definition of
"plant" could include facilities for steel making comprised of several production units,
i.e., blast furnaces and steel furnaces. I believe this to be a valid approach.
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ing that structural reorganization would lead to loss in terms of production efficiency. Therefore, until satisfactory evidence is presented,
it would seem that Mr. Means' rejection of divestiture and dissolution
on the grounds of loss of production efficiency is based upon an unwarranted premise.
Mr. Means also rejects the idea that increased government regulation of prices would be a good solution to the problem of private pricing
power. In discussing the drawbacks of such an approach, he points out
that increased government control would have a number of economic disadvantages.7 In the first place, the costs of regulation would be great,
and the profit pressure on management for economic efficiency would
be weakened. Due to the delay occasioned by working with a government commission, flexibility of enterprise would be reduced; furthermore, in a regulated industry, venturesomeness on the part of management is limited. Other disadvantages to be weighed are the inevitable
conflict between the industry and the government regulating agency and
the danger that the regulatory commission will become a political instrument or subservient to the enterprise over which it exercises control.
At the same time, administrative competition, which exists today in
steel and other industries, does not serve the public interest. In the case
of industries in which prices are administered and entry is easy, the
ease of entry may act to reduce premium profits, but part or all of this
reduction is brought about by increased costs due to the inefficiency and
merely partial operation of the more numerous enterprises which come
into being because of the profit lure. This is competitive waste which
does not serve the public by reducing consumer prices. In the case of
industries in which prices are administered and entry is difficult, the
producer can set his price below the monopoly price but above the price
which would eliminate premium profits. Many firms in this category
have adopted a system of target pricing, which is pricing for a target
rate of return on investment over a period of years. This procedure
does not serve the public interest, because many of the enterprises which
employ target pricing set a target which is well above that required to
make prices just cover economic costs, including a fair (or competitive)
rate of return on capital.
Another possible solution to the existence of private economic
power which adversely affects the public interest is an appeal to the
management (or owners) of giant enterprises to consider the public
6. Id. at 269. For a discussion of the evidence on this question, see Bain, Indiatrial
Organization ch. 9 (1959).
7. P. 191-92.
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interest in setting prices. This approach is flatly rejected on the grounds
that common sense and human nature indicate that it is really little more
than wishful thinking. Furthermore, managers are not in the best position to gauge the public interest. For this reason, even conscientious
management would probably not be successful in protecting the public
from the harmful economic effects of the existence of giant enterprises.
Before posing his own solution to the problem, the author attempts
to re-evaluate some of the basic philosophy underlying the traditional
economic theory of classical competition. His first observation is that
a separation of control and ownership has occurred in the large collective
enterprises under consideration. This separation makes inapplicable the
theory of classical competition which assumes that the functions of control and ownership will be found in the person of one entrepreneur.
Since this separation is a fact, in whose interest should a collective enterprise be run? Since the owners of the corporation have surrendered an
important part of their "rights" in the corporation, should they retain all
of the other property rights which are normally associated with ownership? The theory of classical competition which permits the full play of
the profit motive breaks down since the highest profits, at least if distributed to the owners, are not providing any incentive to the managers
of the business. On the other hand, no answer is to be found by permitting the profits to supply incentive to management and simply pay
the "wages of capital." This would lead to an unregulated profit drive
on the part of management which would hardly serve the public interest.
The harmful effect of the drive for profits upon the public interest
is fourfold. (1) Because it leads to premium profits, it creates a distorted ratio between prices and costs; (2) These same premium profits
lead to a distortion in the division of income; (3) Generally, they will
bring about an inefficient use of resources ;8 (4) Finally, while technical
progress may be great under such a system, adoption of technological
improvements will be slower, since innovations will not be accepted until
they can earn premium profits.
This analysis of the failure to achieve the results of traditional economic theory in the large-scale collective enterprise points out the need
for reducing emphasis upon the drive for corporate profits and for
seeking what the author calls economic performance in the operation of
these enterprises. Mr. Means states two basic principles which he be8. The author explains this in the following manner: "If some prices are out of
line with costs and others are not, the best use of resources would not be made. Too
little would go into the high-priced production and too much into the low. For example,
if steel prices were too high in relation, say, to lumber, there would tend to be an
overuse of lumber in construction and less than optimum use of steel." P. 273.
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lieves are essential to this idea. In the first place, "management will
and should run a collective enterprise in its own interest." Secondly,
"conditions can and should be established, so that when management
operates a collective enterprise in management's own interest, the public
interest will also be served." 9
The author's practical application of these two principles involves the
use of target rates of return by collective enterprises. The target rates
set, however, should be such that the resulting prices will just cover
economic costs (including a fair rate of return on capital). The second
major aspect of the proposed program is the use of new bonus incentives
which, unlike present bonus plans, will reward management for achieving economic performance rather than high profits.
In order to implement this program, the adoption of a new federal
law, the Economic Performance Act, is proposed. The new law would
contain four major sections. The first of these would be one establishing
a legal category (for tax purposes) for the collective corporation. The
determination of collective status would be left to a semijudicial commission. The basic guideline for this determination would be "the existence of unregulated pricing power of sufficient magnitude to affect
the corporation with a substantial public interest."' 10 As a general proposition, the author suggests that any manufacturing corporation controlling assets of half a billion dollars would have the burden of overcoming
the presumption of collective status. Firms in the $100 to $500 million
class would be subject to consideration under the new program, however."
The second major section of the act would permit special tax deductions for corporations operating under the new law. These deductions
would apply to the bonus system developed as a reward to management
for economic performance. While the definition of the term economic
performance raises difficulties, the author feels that a general definition
specifying, largely in terms of the effects of classical competition, the
end result to be achieved will be sufficient for the time being.
The third section of the act would require a system of target pricing bearing a reasonable relation to costs of capital. The corporation
would have a period of time (five years) in which to submit an acceptable target pricing plan to the commission for approval. Such plans
9. P. 277.
10. P. 298.
11. Figures presented at congressional hearings indicate that in 1957 there were
62 industrial corporations controlling assets of over half a billion and 200 with assets
between 100 and 500 million. The Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th Cong., 1st sess., pursuant to S. Res. 57,
pp. 100-916. The reader will have recognized that smaller but ologopolistic local or
specialty firms would not be covered initially -by the author's program.
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would be worked out initially without interference from the commission
or any other government agency.
Finally, the act would contain a section inducing security holders of
a corporation to adopt the new program. This might include a provision for an excess profits tax which applied only to legally determined
collective enterprises which failed to make the shift to the new mode of
operation. This would make it more profitable in the eyes of the stockholders for the corporation to assume its new responsibilities. A voluntary break-up into smaller units would remain as an alternative. At the
same time, of course, the act would have to be couched in terms consistent with constitutionality.
Every phase of this new program raises important and difficult
questions of interpretation. What, more precisely, is meant by the terms
"collective status" and "economic performance"? What is a fair target
rate of return, and how is such a rate to be determined? The author
acknowledges that several years of discussion and refinement are necessary before his proposals could be made workable. He invites this discussion after giving some of his own ideas on all of these matters. That
his new program is far from ready for legislative consideration is beside the point. What is important is that the author has developed a
theory of dealing with the problem of privately held economic power on
the part of a group of corporations controlling perhaps two-thirds of the
instruments of manufacturing production and accounting for half of the
manufacturing output in the United States. 2 While he is unable to
adduce empirical evidence in support of all of the economic theory
underlying the new proposal, the author has argued convincingly on the
basis of the evidence available. One is convinced that the new proposal,
whether workable or not, takes account of realistic economic considerations. If it were to be accepted, the legal problems it involves could
doubtless be resolved by the professional skill and statesmanship that
would be needed.
Most important of all, Mr. Means has developed a plan for avoiding one of the characteristics of possible alternatives which many individuals on both sides of the problem deplore: government control over
the flow of decisions in the management of business enterprises. Moreover, to the extent that dissolution and divestiture are not practical (or
possible under existing law), the Economic Performance Act offers a
possible alternative. Pricing Power and thw Public Interest deserves the
consideration of all who believe that the question to which the author
12. P. 299.
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addresses himself is vital and that original and intelligent analysis is the
first and perhaps most important step toward solution of the problem.
VINCENT M. NATHANt

By David W. Peck. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.
1961. Pp. vii, 303. $4.00.

DECISION AT LAW.

Judge Peck is a distinguished jurist with an engaging writing style.
His latest book can be read with pleasure and profit by many Americans.
The image of the lawyer in America is complex. It includes the
Perry Mason picture of the clever fellow who brings justice in roughly
the same way the Marines or Cavalry of the movies bring help in the
nick of time. It also includes the picture of the scheming shyster who
uses his knowledge of legal intricacies to fill the pockets of his client
and himself, regardless of where truth or justice may lie. There is a
feeling that lawyers use the intricacies of the law the way pharmacists
use the hieroglyphics on prescriptions, to bilk customers or clients of
fees which can be levied because no one except the initiated is allowed
access to the key which would translate the mumbo-jumbo into straightforward information for which no specialist would be required as interpreter. Finally, there is a body of opinion which regards the lawyer
as a member of an elite group in our society, making valuable contributions to the successful conduct of our societal and interpersonal affairs.
Most laymen know too little about the ways of the law to do more
than take on faith this last picture of the lawyer as society's servant.
Judge Peck's book is designed to provide its readers with information
from which they can derive an appreciation of the role which the lawyer
performs and of the ways in which our courts adapt existing laws to the
new situations which our system continually produces.
In Decision at Law Judge Peck has presented in disarmingly informal fashion studies of a series of difficult legal problems with which
courts and lawyers have been forced to deal in recent decades. The subject matter may be familiar to lawyers, but to the non-lawyer the questions presented are fresh and fascinating. Most non-lawyers, for instance, have not even wondered whether an unborn child should count
as an heir. As presented by Judge Peck, descriptions of several matters
of established law such as this are frequently as intriguing as the story
t Teaching Associate, Indiana University School of Law.

